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Abstract
In human-machine communication, people interact with a communication partner that 
is of a different ontological nature from themselves. This study examines how people con-
ceptualize ontological differences between humans and computers and the implications 
of these differences for human-machine communication. Findings based on data from 
qualitative interviews with 73 U.S. adults regarding disembodied artificial intelligence 
(AI) technologies (voice-based AI assistants, automated-writing software) show that peo-
ple differentiate between humans and computers based on origin of being, degree of 
autonomy, status as tool/tool-user, level of intelligence, emotional capabilities, and inher-
ent flaws. In addition, these ontological boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred 
as technologies emulate more human-like qualities, such as emotion. This study also 
demonstrates how people’s conceptualizations of the human-computer divide inform 
aspects of their interactions with communicative technologies. 
Keywords: human-machine communication, ontology, artificial intelligence,  
computers, humanity, mobile voice assistants, automated journalism,  
human-computer interaction, human-robot interaction
Introduction
Within the past two decades, technology companies have introduced numerous forms of 
communicative technologies, programs, and devices that function in the role of a com-
municator by exchanging messages with people or by performing a communicative task 
on their behalf (e.g., chatbots, automated-writing software). People now are interacting 
with communicators that are of a different ontological nature from themselves, prompting 
scholars to ask how ontological divides between communicators shape people’s interactions 
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with technology (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018). The goal of this study is to better understand 
aspects of the ontological dimensions of human-machine communication. To do so, the 
study focuses on two research questions: (1) How do people conceptualize the ontological 
differences between humans and computers? and (2) What are the implications of these 
ontological differences for the human-machine communication process? 
This study contributes to the growing body of knowledge regarding the role of ontol-
ogy in Human-Machine Communication (HMC), an emerging area of communication 
research focused on meaning-making between humans and machines (Guzman, 2018). 
In human communication, a person’s behavior is guided by their interpretations of their 
communication partner (Pavitt, 2009), and a key factor informing those interpretations is 
the nature of both communicators. As Dautenhahn (2004) explains, when people interact 
with one another, they occupy the same ontological category (human), but when people 
interact with technology, each communicator belongs to a different category (human or 
machine). Researchers have found that people’s conceptualizations of the nature of humans 
and machines matter for how they make sense of and interact with technology (e.g., A. P. 
Edwards, 2018; Sundar, 2008), but ongoing research is needed regarding how people con-
ceptualize communicators occupying different ontological categories and the role of such 
conceptualizations in people’s communicative behavior with technology (A. P. Edwards, 
2018). This study continues this work by examining people’s conceptualizations of the dif-
ferences between humans and computers and how these differences inform people’s percep-
tions of and interactions with communicative technologies. 
The paper begins by explaining the study’s focus on the nature of humans and comput-
ers before synthesizing foundational scholarship in artificial intelligence to identify exist-
ing ontological boundaries between people and computers. Next, HMC research regarding 
the nature of humans and machines is reviewed. This study was conducted by analyzing 
qualitative data regarding people’s conceptualizations of the differences between humans 
and computers from two different projects regarding communicative technologies. The 
first part of the findings section presents the human-computer divides identified within the 
study, including new boundaries, while the second part explains the implications of these 
boundaries for human-machine communication. Finally, limitations and future research 
directions are presented.
Literature Review
The Nature of Humans and Computers
Human-Machine Communication as an area of research is so named to signal the difference 
in the nature of its communicators, with “machine” purposely used instead of “technol-
ogy” as an acknowledgment of the long cultural, philosophical, and technological history 
regarding machines in relation to humans (see Guzman, 2018). In this study, the machine 
is conceptualized as a meta-ontological category encompassing multiple technologies. 
From antiquity, people have theorized what it is to be human in comparison and contrast to 
human-made items and nature (Boden, 2006; Riskin, 2007). As machines and society have 
evolved, so too have people’s definitions of the boundary between themselves and machines 
(Turkle, 1984; Verbeek, 2005). The many permutations of the human-machine divide are 
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too numerous and complex to examine here, and so this study focuses on the contemporary 
boundary between people and computers. The computer is positioned here as an ontologi-
cal subcategory of the machine and encompasses the communicative technologies studied 
within HMC. Although many communicative technologies are accessed via hardware other 
than the computer, the computer is their technological progenitor. 
From a historical and theoretical standpoint, the computer’s introduction was a key 
turning point in the nature of machines (Turkle, 1984; Weizenbaum, 1976). In contrast 
to industrial machines that provide the “muscle” of manual labor, computers perform 
computations—“mental” processes once assumed to be unique to humans. Thus, comput-
ers challenge the ontological boundary between people and machines and, in doing so, the 
nature of each (Turkle, 1984). 
Artificial intelligence research has further challenged the human-computer divide by 
using humans as prototypes for developing new technological capabilities (Boden, 2006; 
Dreyfus, 1999; Haugeland, 1985; Turkle, 1984). A key human capability being recreated 
within technology is the ability to communicate (Wachsmuth, 2008). The aim for imbuing 
technology with this ability is for interactions with devices to feel “natural” (Wachsmuth, 
2008), similar to people’s conversations with one another. The result has been technologies 
that are designed to exhibit human traits, such as gendered voices, and to emulate human 
communicative behaviors, such as using a person’s name. The communicative technologies 
that are the subject of HMC research are the products of ongoing efforts to bridge the onto-
logical gap between people and computers.
Human-Computer Divides
Ontologies are informed by people’s worldviews (Chitty, 1997), and so the defining char-
acteristics of the nature of humans and computers vary across individuals, cultures, and 
academic disciplines as do the boundaries between them. This review focuses on several 
key ontological divides between people and computers articulated regarding artificial intel-
ligence, the study of which is focused on bridging these ontological boundaries (Franchi & 
Güzeldere, 2005). 
Origin of being. This boundary is predicated on the difference in how humans and comput-
ers come into existence. Machines have a single point of origin: they are made by humans 
(Franchi & Güzeldere, 2005). People’s perspectives on the genesis of humans, however, vary. 
A biological definition of humans situates people as part of the natural world and the prod-
uct of evolution (Mazlish, 1993), while a spiritual perspective theorizes humans as divine 
beings created by a high power and superior to the rest of creation (Foerst, 2005) as the only 
beings to possess a soul (Minsky, 1986). 
Autonomy. As an artificial object created by humans, the computer also is viewed as lack-
ing another fundamental human trait—autonomy, the ability to act of one’s volition (Boden, 
2006; Suchman, 2011). Computers are programmed and, thus, viewed as being restricted 
to executing operations as directed by humans rather than having the free will of people. 
Relatedly, only humans are conceptualized as having a sense of self, an awareness of who 
they are in relation to the world around them (Haugeland, 1985; Mazlish, 1993).
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Emotion. The most straightforward articulation of this divide is that humans can feel and 
express emotion, computers cannot. It is this difference that has been key to how people 
perceive the ability of computers to make judgments in contrast to humans. Weizenbaum 
(1976) argues that within modernity, reason has been defined by the pursuit of science 
detached from feeling. Emotions, within this modernist perspective, are conceptualized 
as the antithesis of thought and reason (Minsky, 1986). As expressed by Bolter (1984), “the 
computer ‘thinks’ by means of dispassionate, logical, calculation” (p. 75) and, thus, is con-
ceptualized as embodying the scientific ideal (Weizenbaum, 1976). For those who subscribe 
to this ideal, decisions rendered by computers are superior to those by humans whose emo-
tions cloud their judgments. 
However, it should be noted that such a view of the relationship between emotions and 
judgment has long been contested by some AI scholars (e.g., Minsky, 1986; Weizenbaum, 
1976) and within more contemporary research within the social sciences (e.g., D. Evans, 
2010; Vincent & Fortunati, 2009). Emotion is a critical component of the communication 
process and how people interact with and make sense of their world, including the emotion 
people experience that is mediated by technology (Vincent & Fortunati, 2009).
Intelligence. The introduction of the computer brought into question what it meant to 
have a “mind” and who, or what, could possess a mind (Turkle, 1984). The result was the 
prediction and establishment of parameters for “machine intelligence” (e.g., Turing, 1950) 
followed by an ongoing debate regarding how to achieve such intelligence, if doing so were 
even possible (e.g., Boden, 2006; Dreyfus, 1999; Minsky, 1986). Within these debates, the 
nature of intelligence itself has been contested (Boden, 2006; Kasabov, 2008). Today the 
question of whether a mind can be recreated within a machine remains unresolved (e.g., 
“Can We Copy the Brain?,” 2017).
Communication. As Peters (2012) explains, philosophers such as Aristotle and Descartes 
viewed communication as a defining human trait. Beginning in the 19th century, the pro-
cess of communication came to be culturally perceived as a critical element of the human 
experience (Peters, 2012). Within this context, the formal study of communication emerged 
and came to focus primarily on people (e.g., Schramm, 1982). In contrast, artificial intel-
ligence and related fields have theorized communication as the exchange of information 
between sender and receiver, which can be a human or machine (see Guzman, 2018). The 
ontological divide within AI, and now communication following the establishment of 
HMC (Guzman & Lewis, 2019), is not predicated upon whether people or computers com-
municate but on how they communicate. Within AI and related fields, research has focused 
on mitigating this divide between people and computers as communicators (e.g., National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1976). A key approach in addressing this divide has 
been to replicate human traits within computers and to model human-computer interac-
tion upon human communication (e.g., Licklider, 1960; Wachsmuth, 2008).
While the divides reviewed here are central within AI research, they alone cannot rep-
resent every facet of the human-computer divide. Ontological boundaries are shaped by 
the discipline in which they originate (J. H. Evans, 2016), and so, the preceding discussion 
based in the AI literature may not be representative of ontological perspectives in other 
fields. Recent research regarding cultural representations of technology also has found that 
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elements of ontological definitions can vary between researchers and the public as well as 
overlap (e.g., Sarrica et al., 2019). Furthermore, ontologies can evolve, including in response 
to technology (Turkle, 1984). 
The Ontology of Communicators: Human and Computer
When humans interact with other people, they rapidly take into account numerous aspects 
of their communication partner and this assessment, in turn, guides their communica-
tive behavior (Pavitt, 2009). A key aspect of human communication that often is taken for 
granted is that this exchange is taking place between humans. This ontological sameness 
among communicators, Dautenhahn (2004) argues, allows for a series of assumptions to 
guide the interaction: 
When faced with a human in a department store, we might ask ourselves, “Who 
is this?” . . . Yet we know clearly what the person is—namely a member of the 
human species, which already allows us to make quite strong assumptions about 
his or her abilities, skills, and capacities. (p. 56)
But in human-machine communication, ontological assumptions may not be as straight-
forward. Dautenhahn (2004) continues, “In contrast, a robot or software agent in the role 
of a sales assistant leaves us widely in the open about its skills and capacities. Can it talk? 
Can it understand English? Does it know what the color blue is?” (p. 56). Interactions with 
machines, particularly initial interactions, require people to first determine the nature of 
the communicator, what it is, that then determines subsequent communication behavior 
(Dautenhahn, 2004). Exactly what people determine a digital interlocutor to be influences 
their assessment of it as a message source (Sundar & Nass, 2001) and their judgment of how 
it should be treated (A. P. Edwards, 2018).
In human-human communication, people draw from their experience of communicat-
ing with humans and their personal knowledge of what it is to be a human to make sense of 
their communication partner. Within human-machine communication, the onus is on the 
human to decipher the nature of the communicative technology without the advantage of 
having shared experiences (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1976). As has 
been discussed, technologies designed as communicators also merge traits of people and 
computers and, in some instances, even animals. The question, then, is how people assign 
ontological categories to devices and programs that bring together traits across ontological 
boundaries (A. P. Edwards, 2018). 
In a study of consumer judgments of news sources, Sundar and Nass (2001) introduce 
the “computer heuristic” to explain people’s preference for a computer to select a news story 
for them because they perceive the computer’s selection to be more “random” and, thus, 
less biased than a human’s selection. Sundar (2008) relabels the “computer heuristic” as the 
“machine heuristic” and explains that this heuristic results in “attributions of randomness, 
objectivity, and other mechanical characteristics” to a computer’s actions (p. 83). Because 
these characteristics are associated with unbiased judgment, people drawing upon this heu-
ristic are likely to consider the computer a credible source (Sundar, 2008). What is not 
immediately clear, however, is what other traits people may associate with computers that 
also may influence their judgment of technology. 
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A. P. Edwards (2018) observed that in interactions with a humanoid robot, some people 
acted toward the robot as they would another human, some people treated it similar to a 
pet, and others approached it as a computer. For A. P. Edwards, these differences hinted 
that people may be associating the robot with more familiar entities: humans, animals, and 
machines. Subsequent research by A. P. Edwards found that people think of animals and 
humans to be more similar to one another than a robot because they have a shared origin 
(biological or divine) separate from that of the human-built robot. These associations of 
ontological sameness and difference also had implications for how people judged other 
people’s actions toward a robot. 
Overall, people’s interpretations of the nature of communicative technology is a cru-
cial aspect of their judgment of and interactions with technology (Dautenhahn, 2004; 
A. P. Edwards, 2018; Sundar, 2008; Sundar & Nass, 2001). Continued study of these inter-
pretations is important to provide an understanding of how people perceive technology 
as a communicative other (A. P. Edwards, 2018) and begins with establishing how people 
conceptualize the nature of computers and humans. Ontological categories are defined 
by their boundaries (Franchi & Güzeldere, 2005), and the study of the human-computer 
divide provides an understanding of the nature of each entity in addition to their dif-
ferences (e.g., Turkle, 1984). AI research has identified key human-computer divides but 
given that ontological definitions can vary between scholars and the public (Sarrica et 
al., 2019), differ across academic fields (J. H. Evans, 2016), and evolve over time (Turkle, 
1984), ongoing research is warranted. Therefore, the first research question focuses on how 
people differentiate between humans and computers. The second research question then 
focuses on the implications of these ontological divides for the process of human-machine 
communication. 
Method
The data analyzed in this study was collected during two large-scale research projects regard-
ing the ontology of disembodied artificial intelligence as communicator. The first project 
focused on voice-based, mobile AI assistants (e.g., Apple’s Siri) (Guzman, 2015), while the 
second project, which began in 2018 and is ongoing, focuses on automated news-writing 
software (e.g., Automated Insights’s Wordsmith). Both AI technologies can be considered 
disembodied because they are software without the type of physical form that research has 
shown to be key in people’s interpretations of embodied communicators (e.g., Wachsmuth 
et al., 2008). Each project had specific research questions relative to the technology being 
studied, but the projects also had shared elements. Both projects focused on people’s con-
ceptualizations of a communicator that is of a different ontological nature than themselves 
and, therefore, examined how people conceptualize the ontological boundary between 
humans and computers. Bringing data from both projects into a single study enables more 
data points to be analyzed and for trends to be compared and contrasted regarding related 
technologies, adding to the robustness of the study’s findings.
Both projects used the same protocol for sampling, data collection, and analysis. The 
method was semi-structured interviews because the goal of the research was to examine 
people’s conceptualizations of novel technologies. Qualitative inquiry, generally, and inter-
views, in particular, are well-suited for research that is explanatory and exploratory and that 
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foregrounds participants’ knowledge (see Marshall & Rossman, 1995). Following an induc-
tive approach that enables participants to articulate their understanding of a technology 
also helps to fill in gaps between expert and user knowledge (Lee et al., 2014). 
Purposive sampling was used in both projects. The researcher recruited participants 
in-person from public places (e.g., libraries, transit stations) within a large city in the 
United States’ Midwest. Participants were selected based on factors germane to each proj-
ect, including technology use (i.e., people using a certain technology or none at all), news 
consumption (automated news project), and demographic characteristics. Data from 46 
of 64 participants within the mobile AI project and 27 of 29 people in the automated news 
project were analyzed for this study. The number of participants whose data is used in this 
study is fewer because some interviews did not discuss the nature of people and comput-
ers. The 73 participants included in this study ranged in age from 18 to 76 (M = 37.7, SD = 
16.7): 59% identified as female, 40% as male, and 1% as non-binary. The racial and ethnic 
identity of participants was White (56%), Black (16%), Hispanic (11%), Asian (10%), Mid-
dle Eastern (3%), mixed-race (3%), and other (1%). Highest level of education attained was 
graduate degree (16%), some graduate school (11%), bachelor’s degree (40%), associate or 
vocational degree (8%), some college (18%), or high school diploma (7%). Participants pri-
marily resided in urban (67%) and suburban (23%) areas. No trends were identified within 
the findings related to demographic characteristics, but findings should be viewed within 
the context of a sample of highly-educated participants living in an urban area. 
Interviews were conducted in-person at the sites where participants were recruited. 
Participants selected an alias for the audio-recorded interviews and were assigned a new 
alias for this report. The interview protocol was developed around the concept of the “active 
interview” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997) that emphasizes the meaning-making process 
between researcher and participant. The questionnaire was developed from the literature 
and served as a guide for the interview with the course of each interview adapted to par-
ticipant responses. This study focuses on participant answers to the question: “What is the 
difference between humans and computers?” 
Data collection and analysis were concurrent, as is standard in qualitative research 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1995). The endpoint of data collection was saturation—the point at 
which the data being collected becomes redundant and no longer contributes to new the-
oretical insight (Charmaz, 2014). Within the voice assistant project, saturation was based 
on the project’s key research questions, not individual interview questions, but analysis of 
responses to the interview question asking people to differentiate between humans and 
computers showed distinct trends and redundancy in the data, indicating question-specific 
saturation. Aspects of the automated news project are ongoing, but the project has pro-
gressed enough to determine that saturation had been reached regarding people’s concep-
tualizations of the differences between humans and computers. 
Data analysis also was inductive. The researcher analyzed verbatim interview transcripts 
using MaxQDA software. To answer this study’s first research question, the researcher ana-
lyzed responses regarding the difference between humans and computers. Analysis of the 
separate data sets began with in-vivo coding in which individual responses were coded with 
a descriptive phrase using a person’s own words (see Saldaña, 2013). The researcher used 
the in-vivo codes to identify similarities within responses and then assigned new shared 
codes to grouped responses reflecting the same perspective. Data sets were merged, and the 
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researcher continued this inductive coding process focused on identifying patterns within 
the data regarding aspects of human-computer divides. The researcher compared these 
emerging patterns to the AI literature to identify points of overlap and divergence before 
finalizing the divides discussed here. The study’s second research question was answered 
by using participant responses as analyzed above to contextualize their opinions toward or 
interactions with disembodied AI programs as documented during other aspects of partic-
ipant interviews. 
Findings
Conceptualizing the Human-Computer Divide
Analysis resulted in several key findings that contribute to a greater understanding of the 
human-computer divide. Consistent with existing research (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018), peo-
ple’s conceptualizations of ontological boundaries are not uniform, but the differences artic-
ulated in this study are wider ranging. While mirroring ontological divides within the AI 
literature, participants identified additional boundaries based on the relationship between 
tools and tool-users and the flaws inherent to a particular group, most often humans. More 
than half of participants identified two or more differences between people and computers. 
Although scholars may categorize ontological divides as distinct, in the minds of some peo-
ple, they are interrelated, with one divide often serving as the foundation for another. The 
percentage of participants identifying particular divides is included to provide a general 
sense of their prevalence but should be viewed within the limitations of this study’s design. 
Interview quotes are edited for conciseness.
Origin of being. For 18% of participants, the origin of computers separated them from 
humans. Participants described the computer as an object that is “developed” or “pro-
grammed” by people. For example, Jeremy explains, “For the most part, I think that, of 
course, you know, computers are made by humans.” Left unsaid in most of these responses 
is the origin of humans: It is enough that computers are made by people to be ontologically 
separate from them. Participants who do discuss people’s origins reference their biological 
or divine nature. For example, Brad states: “So a computer, obviously, we know where a 
computer comes from. Humans, no idea. I mean, you can either believe god or you can 
trace your evidence, but nobody knows.” Such answers are consistent with the AI and HMC 
literature (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018; Foerst, 2005). 
The nature of the computer as constructed object also serves as the foundation for the 
other ways in which people differentiate between humans and computers. For Fatimah, 
because people build computers, they are “smarter.” In contrast, Brenda thinks the artifi-
cial nature of the computer gives it an advantage over the biological limitations of people: 
“Humans make computers, so I kind of think, sometimes, computers may go farther than 
human beings because they never get tired.” Conceptualizations of human and computer 
origins, thus, also shape people’s perspectives of other traits inherent to each.
Tools and tool users. Closely related to the human-computer divide regarding origin 
of being is a divide focused on the nature of computers as “tools” and of people as tool 
users. This divide, which reflects a specific ontological relationship between people and 
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computers, was expressed by 14% of participants. From this perspective, computers not 
only are made by humans but also are made to be used by humans. As Niel states: “Comput-
ers are machines developed by humans to serve humans and other functions.” Niel’s state-
ment also captures another aspect of the difference between people and computers—that as 
machines, computers are intended to be of service to humans, a viewpoint also expressed 
by Joy: “I think computers are a tool to help us assemble information, disseminate infor-
mation.” Although the conceptualization of computers as tools and people as tool users is 
not identified within the AI literature discussed above, it is reflective of perspectives of the 
nature of people dating back more than a century (e.g., Carlyle, 1884) and of the nature of 
technology prominent within Western culture (e.g., Pacey, 1983). 
Autonomy. The view of computer as a tool is one of many perspectives of technology that 
also feed into participant’s conceptualizations of the differences in the levels of autonomy 
between computers and people. The ability to act of one’s own volition is a divide between 
the nature of people and computers that has been discussed by AI scholars (e.g., Boden, 
2006; Suchman, 2011) and, within this study, identified by 26% of participants.
Discussions of autonomy present people as possessing “free will” while the computer 
is restricted because it is programmed by humans, a reference back to its origins. Talula 
explains that “. . . humans, for the most part, we’re autonomous in the way that we think. 
But machines are programmed to think a certain way or to arrive to a certain answer.” This 
programmed nature results in a functional rigidity, according to participants like Dolores: 
“A computer has to be told every single thing to do. A computer can’t think on its own like, 
‘Well, that didn’t work, so let me try something else.’ A computer has to be programmed.” 
In contrast, people’s ability to think autonomously provides them with mental flexibility not 
possessed by computers. Curtis further describes the difference: “I would say a computer is 
told what to do, and it does it. It’s like a tool. I can feel one way about something, and then 
you could tell me, ‘Hey, you should look at it this way,’ and then I might.” Curtis’s remarks 
also demonstrate the interplay among ontological boundaries: Because the computer is a 
programmed tool it cannot act on its own. 
Intelligence. AI researchers have debated whether technology can possess human intelli-
gence for more than 70 years (e.g., “Can We Copy the Brain?,” 2017; Dreyfus, 1999), and 
today this question remains unresolved among scholars and, based on 44% of participants, 
the public as well. Participants identified multiple concepts related to intelligence, such as 
learning, knowledge, and decision-making, as points of delineation between people and 
computers. Some people defined this divide in terms of people possessing intelligence 
while computers do not. The majority of responses, however, reflected degrees of difference 
(Mazlish, 1993), with both people and computers possessing a trait but to varying degrees 
or as expressed differently. 
Participants had wide-ranging perspectives on whether people or computers had the 
greater ability to acquire, process, and retain information. For Carol, humans possess 
greater intellect: “I think our brains are smarter than their’s really.” When asked to explain 
further, Carol adds:
We program computers. We’ve made them the holder, the place holder, of all 
of the things that we want to have at a moment’s touch. But our brains have the 
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capacity to be able to hang onto all kinds of infinite bits of information . . . you 
think about how humanity started and the whole idea of ‘how do you hold onto 
bits of information?’
Intellect, therefore, also is tied to the origin of humans and computers from Carol’s perspec-
tive: That people have stored and passed along knowledge since the start of the species and 
then created computers to assist them elevates human intellect over that of the computer. 
Carol also uses the term “bit”—the vocabulary of the computer—in stating this difference, 
illustrating the argument by scholars that the way people understand and talk about the nature 
of humans and technology remains deeply intertwined (e.g., Agre, 1997; Mazlish, 1993).
Nicki is of a different opinion than Carol: “I feel like a computer would be more—I don’t 
want to say smarter—but maybe more advanced than the average human.” Explaining why, 
she says, “We can just say that maybe they [computers] have a bigger brain if you look at it 
that way. They’re more knowledgeable.” Nicki also would rather receive information from a 
computer because while people and computers are prone to “sources of error,” the computer 
has less error. 
The boundary between humans and computers intellectually also is built around the 
types of knowledge and information each possess and how they make sense of and act upon 
it. Flynn describes this difference in terms of acquired versus accumulated knowledge: 
You have intellect. You have intelligence. You have acquired knowledge. You 
know, the AI is probably based on, as I know it, accumulations of knowledge. 
But we learn . . . And that’s one of the nice things about being a person is that as 
you live, you learn. I’m almost 70, and I still learn.
Both humans and computers have knowledge from Flynn’s perspective, but what gives 
humans intelligence and sets them apart from computers is that their knowledge is the 
result of lived experience. In contrast, computers have compiled facts and figures but with-
out this context. 
For participants similar to Eleanor, the intellectual divide is more about the different 
strengths and weaknesses of computers and people than which one has superior intelligence: 
Humans can think. Computers can compute. Computers can remember things. 
They retain information. They can find information. They do all kinds of stuff 
like that very quickly and very easily, and I certainly can’t do that sort of thing. 
But a computer can’t say, ‘Does this make sense?’ 
Eleanor’s answer points to a clear, but borderline tautological, divide between how people 
and computers deal with information, with computers excelling at some tasks and humans 
at others. 
Emotion: Emotion also was a prominent divide, with 44% of participants saying the ability 
to feel and express emotion and to share in this process separates people from computers. 
Rachel explains that emotion is an exclusively human trait: “I mean the difference is defi-
nitely emotions . . . being able to feel compassionate for someone else, empathy, all that, 
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sympathy.” As with other divides, the line drawn over emotion can be shaped by people’s 
views of the autonomy and origin of humans and computers. Janet explains that the com-
puter lacks emotion because “ultimately it’s already programmed by a human. It’s still a 
machine. It’s not designed as a real, thinking person would be.” As an artificial object, com-
puters cannot have emotion.
Aware of this ontological divide, developers have designed communicative technolo-
gies with emotional cues (e.g., Breazeal, 2002). Some participants who have interacted with 
these technologies consider emotion to be a shared trait between people and computers. 
During an interview regarding Siri, Rosa states “. . . it’s kind of like bridging the line between 
technology and human emotions. I know you can tell it jokes, and it would respond to it 
sometimes . . .” Regarding what Rosa considers to be the difference between people and 
computers, she states, “Um, I don’t know. Maybe it’s just [the] sense where you can actually 
interpret the difference in sarcasm, humor. Because there’s some things you can tell Siri, 
and it wouldn’t register.” For people like Rosa, technology can express emotion but not 
understand it.
For other participants, the fact that computers cannot understand emotion is central 
to the divide. Even when a communicative technology may seem to express emotion, par-
ticipants like Brad argue that what is being conveyed is “perceived emotion.” Andrew also 
explains further: “. . .  you can’t really input empathy into technology that’s genuine. Of 
course, you can have sort of false and pseudo-empathy.” Similar to the nature of intelligence, 
which has become its own ontological debate within AI (Boden, 2006), the nature of emo-
tion also is increasingly contested.
Emotions also continue to remain central to people’s differing conceptualizations of 
judgments rendered by people and computers. For some participants, such as Amy, com-
puters are better able to make certain types of decisions because they do not have emotions:
I think machines are able to make very hard decisions and are able to see  
everything through the constant lens of logic and rationality, whereas humans 
are very irrational and erratic, and there’s change to them, and they’re emotion-
al and weird and kind of unpredictable, whereas machines are predictable and 
logical.
From Amy’s perspective, emotions interfere with human judgment and emotionless tech-
nologies are better able to make certain decisions. However, other participants think the 
computer’s lack of emotion is problematic for its judgment. Devon explains, “So it’s kind 
of like the King Solomon thing, like split the baby in half. That’s how computers would 
think, but we would think, ‘Oh my god, that’s terrible.’” Devon is referencing a story from 
the Judeo-Christian tradition in which Solomon determines the rightful mother of a baby 
using a test of empathy. For Devon, who has a background in neuroscience, emotion and 
empathy provide people with a more complex understanding of the world that is vital to 
decision-making. Amy’s remarks exemplify the cultural conceptualization of emotions as 
detrimental to judgment, while Devon’s comments echo the counter-argument. Both signal 
that the debate over emotion, judgment, and technology has not abated among members 
of the public and may even become more complex if more people interpret technology as 
having emotion. 
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Inherent flaws. Twelve percent of the responses from participants in this study offered 
a perspective of the difference between humans and computers that favored technology. 
These responses are separate from those previously discussed that weighed the advantages 
and disadvantages of human and computer traits tied to larger discussions of particular 
divides. The responses discussed here were offered as the primary reason humans and com-
puters are different. 
When asked to identify the difference between people and computers, Trisha replies, 
“I think that people make mistakes and do things inefficiently, and a computer will make 
less mistakes and do things more efficiently.” Similarly, Natalie states, “I think humans are 
more flawed . . . computers have their technical difficulties too, but in terms of the answers 
they’ll give you, or the stuff they’re supposed to do, humans could actually screw up a lot 
more in terms of that.” Jaheim’s initial response was to state that people do not have good 
intentions, adding that he has “met a few bad people” but should not “really use that as a 
judgment.” Jaheim continues: “But I do think that computers could be more honest [than 
humans]. I mean pretty much if you tell a computer to do something, it will do that, and it 
will do that to the best of its ability.” In contrast, Jaheim explains, humans “cut corners” and 
“try to slack.”
The reason why some participants focused on the shortcomings of humans is not clear, 
and it is more difficult to locate these answers in ontological perspectives within the litera-
ture. However, the responses discussed here place the flaws of people, at least partly, within 
a task- or work-based context. Critical theorists of technology have argued that within a 
capitalist society, the development of performance standards around the capabilities of 
machines, such as efficiency, would result in people being viewed as inherently less than 
machines (e.g., Noble, 2011), an argument extended now to the ways in which people have 
to routinely verify their humanity (Fortunati et al., 2019). Such a judgment is outside the 
scope of this study but is a potential area for continued research.
Other divides. Human-computer divides representing less than 3% of responses 
include possessing a soul (human); consciousness (human); creativity (human); personal-
ity (human); mortality (human); mobility (human); and expendability (computers). Many 
of these divides appear in the data of only one project, potentially suggesting that certain 
boundaries may be associated with specific communicative technologies; however, the 
number of people identifying these divides is so small that it is not possible to reach a 
determination within this study. 
Implications for Human-Machine Communication
The study’s second research question focused on the implications of ontological boundaries 
for the human-machine communication process. The findings are drawn from participants’ 
explanations of their judgments of or behaviors with communicative technology that were 
consistent with their answers to the interview question regarding the difference between 
humans and computers. As research has shown (e.g., Sundar, 2008; Sundar & Nass, 2001), 
people’s interpretations of the nature of a communicator play a role in their judgments of it, 
including within this study. Some participants’ assessments of a technology’s communica-
tive abilities reflect how people differentiate between humans and computers. In addition, 
aspects of some people’s communicative behavior with technology can be attributed to their 
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interpretations of the human-computer divide, including whether they choose to interact 
with a technology and in what context. 
One of the first decisions people make in human-machine communication is whether to 
even interact with a communicative technology. For some people, this decision is informed 
by their conceptualization of the boundary between humans and computers. Dolores differ-
entiates between people and computers based on the computer’s lack of autonomy that, in 
turn, negatively affects its decision-making. Dolores explains that “computers are not smart 
enough” to engage in verbal exchanges with people because they cannot process messages 
that deviate from their programming, and so she avoids interacting with Siri and similar 
technologies. Rachel also prefers communicating with people because, unlike computers, 
people possess and can understand emotion: “that’s what I like with humans overall com-
pared to computers is because they have feelings.” And so, some people’s conceptualizations 
of the human-computer divide play a role in determining whether they interact with a 
communicative technology at all. 
For other people, decisions about communicating with technology hinge on the pur-
pose of the interaction and whether a human or computer is better suited to achieving that 
goal. Nicki is an avid Siri user who thinks computers are “more knowledgeable” than peo-
ple. When asked if she has ever turned to Siri for information instead of a human, she says, 
“Oh, yeah. Or even if I do [ask a person] I’ll still use her [Siri] to verify.” Nicki’s assessment 
of computers as possessing more information than people informs her decisions of when to 
interact with Siri instead of a person. Similarly, Curtis’s perception of the human-computer 
divide over autonomy plays a role in his decision to interact with people and computers in 
different contexts:
When it comes to certain things, I’m gonna go with the computer. If it comes to 
how to do something, you know, how to feel, or if I’m looking at how to teach 
a lesson, I wanna listen to the teacher who’s been doing it for 20 years over a 
computer program telling me, ‘You should do this.’ I think it’s just that gray area 
that humans have that you can just go, ‘Hmm, okay, I can take this and that.’ A 
computer’s gonna be just what it’s told to give you. 
Curtis weighs the intellectual autonomy of people against the programmed computer in 
choosing when to interact with one type of communicator instead of the other. Curtis’s 
decision to turn to a human regarding his profession also may be indicative of how people 
consider not only ontological difference but also sameness in conceptualizing communica-
tive others (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018). 
The ontological boundary between humans and computers can also inform people’s 
expectations of the capabilities and behaviors of technology during the human-machine 
communication process. For example, Tony thinks computers lack autonomy because they 
are programmed tools. Tony’s conceptualization of the differences between humans and 
computers is reflected in how he contrasts the writing capabilities of human journalists with 
his expectations of news stories created by news-writing programs: “The difference between 
the two . . . is that a human will bring in their own experiences, their own writing style, their 
own background . . . Whereas all the computer can do is take what’s been programmed 
for it and bring it in.” Tony perceives the software’s communicative abilities will be limited 
because its autonomy is limited. 
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As discussed, Rosa perceives Siri as “bridging” the human-computer divide regarding 
emotion and describes these interactions with Siri as “kind of weird.” Rosa explains: “. . . 
usually when you think about your phone, you think of technology. You think robotic. You 
think simple logistics. And so, when you start doing things like telling it jokes, it carries 
more human characteristics, I guess.” What makes interactions with Siri “weird” is that 
Rosa is not expecting emotion to be part of a communicative exchange with a technology; 
this weirdness is not negative for Rosa who enjoys Siri. As A. Edwards et al. (2019) found, 
expectancy violations can take place in human-machine communication when the nature 
of the communicator or its behavior do not match a person’s expectations for an interac-
tion, as is the case in Rosa’s interpretations of Siri. 
People’s conceptualizations of the human-computer divide play an important role in 
human-machine communication, including informing people’s actions with or judgments 
of communicative technologies. As exemplified in Curtis’s decision-making when selecting 
a communication partner, multiple factors, including ontological difference and sameness, 
inform people’s decisions and actions in human-machine communication. Ontological 
boundaries, therefore, are important in people’s communication with technology, but they 
are one of many elements shaping these interactions, as is the case with most aspects of 
communication generally. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to better understand people’s conceptualizations of the onto-
logical divide between humans and computers and the implications for human-machine 
communication. Many of the ontological boundaries within the foundational artificial 
intelligence literature—origin of being, autonomy, intelligence, and emotion—remain lines 
of delineation between people and computers from the perspective of the public. Some of 
these divides, however, are no longer as clear as they once were or are becoming even more 
complex. Most people consider emotion to be a key boundary, but some people’s inter-
actions with communicative technologies designed to emulate human emotions, such as 
Apple’s Siri, have caused them to reassess the degree to which emotion remains a human 
trait. The debate regarding intelligence also continues; although, the question is not neces-
sarily whether technology can be intelligent. For many people, both humans and computers 
have attributes of intelligence: Some people think humans are “smarter” while others think 
computers have bigger “brains.” Relatedly, some people think aspects of human nature are 
inherently flawed when compared to that of computers, constituting a new divide. Based 
on these findings, scholars should be mindful that, although many of these divides are 
long-standing, they are not immune to change, particularly as technology design continues 
to integrate more human characteristics, such as emotion. The emergence of a new divide 
based on human flaws also underscores that these boundaries are not purely technologi-
cal, they are social, and ongoing study is warranted to better understand the social aspects 
shaping these divides. 
This study documents not only what people think divides humans and computers but 
also how people think about these divides. For most people, there is no singular ontological 
Guzman 51
boundary; there are multiple divides, some of which serve as the foundation for others. 
Continued research is needed to better understand the relationship among these divides 
within people’s minds, such as whether particular divides routinely serve as the basis for 
others, and to determine if certain boundaries are more influential than others in shaping 
people’s interpretations of technology. 
As the findings demonstrate, ontological boundaries have important implications for 
various aspects of the human-machine communication process. People’s conceptualizations 
of the differences between humans and computers and the nature of each help to shape their 
overall interpretations of technology as a communicator. These interpretations then inform 
people’s decisions and actions within the human-machine communication process. As doc-
umented here, perceived differences in the nature of humans and computers play a role in 
whether people choose to communicate with a particular technology, when people choose 
to communicate with a technology instead of a human, and what people expect from a 
technology as a communication partner. Because ontologies form the foundation of who or 
what something is as a communicator (Dautenhahn, 2004), it is likely that people’s interac-
tions with technology are influenced by ontological boundaries in other ways not identified 
here, and ongoing research is warranted to understand more fully how ontological divides 
between communicators shape interactions across these divides. Future research also will 
have to clarify the role of ontological divides as one of many factors that influence people’s 
judgments of and actions with communicative technology.
Findings should be considered within the context of the study’s limitations. The find-
ings reported here are based on a sample of highly-educated people living in urban areas 
within the United States, and future research should take into account other populations 
or examine ontological boundaries across groups. The focus of the two research projects 
in which data was collected, disembodied AI technologies, also may have resulted in some 
boundaries being more pronounced, while others may be underrepresented or overlooked. 
For example, people’s conceptualizations of the human-computer divide regarding mobility 
may be different in studies regarding embodied technologies, such as robots. Communi-
cation also was not identified as an ontological boundary, most likely because the focus 
of the research projects was on technologies that could carry out communicative func-
tions. Ongoing research also is needed to determine which boundaries are universal among 
different types of technology and which are restricted to specific devices and programs. 
Finally, given the breadth of people’s conceptualizations of the nature of humans and com-
puters, HMC researchers should consider studying ontological aspects within the context 
of their own research. Adding questions or measures related to ontology may assist scholars 
in better interpreting their results. 
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